We aim to help build programs that do large-scale, expressive non-monotonic reasoning (NMR): especially, "learning agents" that store, and revise, a body of conclusions while continually acquiring new, possibly defensible, premise beliefs. Currently available procedures for forward inference and belief revision are ezhaustive, and thus impractical: they compute the entire non-monotonic theory, then re-compute from scratch upon updating with new axioms.
Introduction
Large-Scale, Expressively Rich, Learning
Agents:
We aim in this work 1 to help build agents that do large scale, expressive non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) . We are interestedespeciallyin what we calllearningagents: automatic programs that store, and revise, a body of conclusionswhile continually acquiringnew, possiblydefeasible, premise beliefs.
In many applications, information about which defaults take precedence over others (have greater prioritization)
is important and available. _ Many applications need the ability to express fairly arbitrary first-order forms of default beliefs (e.g., induction, law, natural language, communication), as well as fairly arbitrary (finite) partial orders of precedence (e.g., specificity, reliability, and authority are not "layered" (a.k.a. "stratified"))). [Grosof, 1991] 'defines and discusses the importance of non-layered priority.
Non-layered priority is needed, for example, to adequately represent default inheritance.
In these applications, we regard as desirable for many reasons, especially validation (both intuitive and rigorous), that a NM formalism be "expressively rich" not only in the above senses, but also that it be equipped with a relatively strong model-theoretic semantics (e.z., cf. Default Logic [Reiter, 1980] , circumscription [McCarthy, 1986] [Lifschitz, 1984] , and Autoepistemic Logic [Moore, 1985] ). In this connection, we also are interested in skeptical or cautious, rather than credulous or brave, entailment. Current Incapabilitles: Currently, expressively rich NMR a has found virtually no application on a large scale (more than order of ten defaults), except for the rather special cases of Prolog-style logic programs and simple inheritance cf. AI frame-based systems. Part of the problem is that there do not yet ex2part of forthcoming PhD dissertation [Grosof, 1992b] 2Note, however, that most of the discussion and results, e.g., about disjoint describability and definitional reformulation and asocially monadic theories, in this paper also apply to the basic case where there ate only two "priority levds": for-sure and defensible.
Sin [Grosof, 1992b], we make this more precise; here, let us just consider circumscription, Default Logic, and Autoepistemic Logic.
istpracticalinferencemechanisms to support storing and revisinga limitedbody of conclusionsas a working theory. Currently, forexpressivelyrichNMR 4, the only procedures for forward s inference are exhaustive: they compute the entire non-monotonic theory (or, even worse, all credulous extensions).
Also, currently, there are no procedures for performing belief revision on a body of conclusions, upon receiving new, asserted axioms (an update), beyond the exhaustive method of re-computing everything from scratch. (By "axiom", we mean a premise belief.) s By belief revision, we mean modifying the stored conclusions to retract those that are no longer entailed by the newly augmented axiom set. z By updating, we mean belief revision plus possibly the inference and storing of some additional conclusions.
Strategy and Summary:
In this work, we attack these problems at the level of logical understanding (rather than, say, domain-dependent control of reasoning). Our analytic perspective is that a prime underlying difficulty in the tasks of inference and updating, as well as in specification, is the logical globality of NMR: in general, conclusions depend on the whole of the axiom set. The exhaustiveness of current methods is, in effect, a manifestation of their caution in dealing with (conflicting) interaction. We define the concept of a prioritized database, using circumscription, as the logical representation of a learning agent that performs sound, but incomplete, expressively rich NMR. By database, we mean a subset of a (NM) theory. Prioritized circumscription meets our prime expressive concerns, offers mathematical convenience, and has inference procedures currently available.
We elaborate a detailed "divide and conquer" strategy. We develop concepts of, and results about, structure in prioritized circumscriptive theories, by showing how to reformulate them in a particular fashion: to be conjunctively"decomposed" hierarchically intoa collection of smaller "part" theories, i.e., sub-theories which we callslices. We show that itis possible, and useful,to slicewithin slices. In this way, we map groups of axioms to groups of conclusions. We use the decompositions to analyzethe interaction between defaults/ parts in a NM theory.Much technical difficultyand trickiness arises from the expressive need to consider non-layered prioritization.
We give theorems that localize entailment and thus show how to make forward inference be selective, as 'including even the propositional special case and the special case of stratified logic programs with negation [Lifschitz, 1987] [ Przymusiaski, 1988] Sbottom-up. By "backward j, we mean totally goaldirected cf. query-answering.
SNM formalisms, e.g., JTMS's [Doyle, 1979] , having such procedures lack our desired expressive properties.
TFor simplicity, we assume that these are the only ones removed from storage.
well as concurrent.
Exhaustive inference on a slice generates only a part of the global theory.
Inferences within each slice (sub-theory) can be performed in parallel with inference within every other slice. All nonmonotonic inference can be localized to the slices; only monotonic inference is required between the slices. We give theorems that localize retraction and thus show how to make belief revision be partial in the sense that, for a given update, the arena of potential retraction is known to be restricted to a particular part of the previous database.
Our results enable the exploitation of other results on inference and belief revision that are limited to expressive special cases, say to do exhaustive forward inference in polynomial time (e.g., the "sympatheticsolitary" case in [Grosof, 1992b] that generalizes predicate completion [Clark, 1978] and the Closed World Assumption).
These special case results can be applied to one, or several, slices, even when they do not apply to the global theory.
Our results areabout well-behavedspecial casesthat are easilyrecognizedin terms of syntacticproperties. The first "cleanly slice.able"
property is disjointness of mentioned predicates.
We show that if the for-sure and default axioms can be partitioned into groups which are disjoint in terms of the predicate symbols they mention, then non-monotonic inference based on each partition can proceed without considering the axioms in the other partitions:
those other axioms are irrelevant in an important sense, as far as that partition is concerned. We show this implies that updating with new for-sure and default axioms that span only some of the previous partitions does not require retracting previous conclusions based purely on the remaining partitions: they are safe.
Most large practical applications,
however, do not display such perfect partitionability of mentioned predicates. The real power from our result about disjointness of predicates comes when it is combined with another kind of reformulation: of the axioms in a given global axiom set, not just of the global axiom set into decomposed constituent axiom sets. We define a concept of disjoint describability: syntactic partitionability after definitional reformulation of the axioms. As part of this, we give a logical definition of a particular kind of definitional (i.e., equivalence-preserving) reformulation with respect to a background theory, modifying the standard logical idea of a conservative extension. We also discuss, and use, another kind of reformulation: to break up open defaults (i.e., schema-type, as opposed to closed, i.e., propositional) into cases. An important difference from definitionally reformulating monotonic theories is that two default axioms D1 and D2 cannot, in general, be equivalently replaced by the default axiom corresponding to the conjunction D1 A D2 the way that two for-sure axioms can always be equivalently replaced by their conjunction B1 A B2. This is why we need to consider reformulation of the axioms one-by-one. More precisely, the algorithm is O(na), where n is the size of the Cglobal) axiom set (which is, moreover, typically much smaller than the whole theory, of course).
We show that our conjunctive decomposition results imply safeties in belief revision. We illustrate the problems of scale in learning agents with an extended example of a prioritized database and show that our safety theorems capture much of the preponderant stability (i.e., most beliefs are preserved after each update) that this database displays through its sequence of updates. We show, using the example, that decompositions on these two bases combine synen2istically, as well as hierarchically:
it is useful to slice within slices. Finally, we observe that our formal reformulation methods are implementable at reasonable cost, and apply to several other NM formalisms. We have polynomial-time algorithms (again, omitted here due to space and focus) for disjoint predicates, as well as for asocially rnonadic, also in O(nS), where n is the size of the (global) axiom set.
A Motivating Example
Next, we give an extended example of a learning agent, in the domain of common-sense default reasoning, that illustrates issues of selective forward inference and partial belief revision on a large scale. We present it first at an intuitive level, and formalize it later.
We adopt the following notation. A .> prefix indicates that the sentence that follows is a base axiom, i.e., has for-sure (non- 
as formal guarantees.
Formal

Definitions: Prioritized Circumscription
We define our notation for axioms from section 2 as a meta-language (the Circumscriptive Language of Defaults, or CLD for short) that, at any point in the update sequence, specifies a prioritized "default" circumscription of the form:
Here, B is the conjunction of the sentence parts of all of the for-sure axioms.
D is the tuple of the default axioms' formula parts.
R is a strict partial order of precedence (priority). in this paper, we for the most part do not consider fixing of predicates, only of functions: W is empty. We omit further details about fixing to save space and to preserve focus; see [Grosof, 1992b] for more.
Prioritized
default circumscription is a slight generalization of prioritized predicate circumscription cf. [Grosof, 1991] . We employ it and CLD to clarify the definitions of axiom sets and of updating, and the intuitive relationship to other formalisms for default reasoning. [Grosof, 1992b] shows as a theorem the equivalence of any prioritized default circumscription to a corresponding, abnormality-style, prioritized predicate circumscription, generalizing a previous result that appeared in [Lifschitz, 1984] . Note that our definition can express minimizing predicates as a special case: e.g., :> abi(z), where abl is an abnormality predicate. We let N stand for the index tuple of D: it is just (isomorphic to) the tuple of the labels of the default axioms. I.e., in the example, after the second update, the elements of j, i) means that the default with label j has strictly higher priority than the default with label i. "K(D;R) is defined as the strict version
Here Dj and Di refer to the jtn and it_ members, respectively, of the tuple D. s We define the corresponding circumscriptive prioritized default theory as the set of all conclusions entailed (model-theoretically, in second-order logic) by the prioritized default circumscription.
9 lo We define a prioritized database PDB) to be a pair, consisting of x CLD axiom set .4 :a the example, the current coli__ :ion of the updates "/i's)); and an associated priort:::ed database theory O8, which is some subset of the F.':-ritized default circumscriptive theory /?(,4) specifi,.d by ,4. Here, C is the non-monotonic theory operator for the CLD formalism.
Decomposition: Concepts
As part of our strategy, we need to develop a strong idea of a part of a non-monotonic theory. This is important for several reasons: 1) to define safe versus unsafe zones for belief revision; 2) to define relevant versus irrelevant context for inference (and for specification); and 3) to define the structure and organization of an overall ("global") prioritized database.
In classical logic, we take for granted such an idea of a part of theory. However, the dependence of entailment on, in general, the entire global axiom set means that we have to "work for it" in NM logical systems.
Our general concept of decomposition is applicable to many NM logical systems.
A global theory T can be obtained either directly by applying the NM theory operator C to the global axiom set .4, or indirectly (but equivalently) via decomposition.
In decomposition, the global axiom set A is decomposed into an associated set of "constituent" axiom sets (the ,.qA_'s). The global theory T is then equivalent to the combi. nation of the corresponding sub-theories (the ST_'s), where each sub-theory is the result of applying C to a constituent axiom set: 8Ti d,_j C($Ai).
SFor notational simplicity, we ignore the potentially different axities of the various open formulas Di.°S ee [Grosof, 1991] and [Grosof, 1992b] for more discussion of how prioritised circumscriptions axe defined. Note that the prioritization p.o. R is not necessarily layered stratified) (indeed, in our example, it is not) as it was in Lifschitz, 1985]. 1°In section 5, we generalize the definition above to include the explicit "fixing" of a set of formulas, e.g., a subset of the predicates. [Grosof, 1992b] gives details. A global theory 7" can be obtained either directly by applying the NM theory operator C to the global axiom set ,4, or indirectly (but equivalently) via decomposition. In decomposition, the global axiom set A is decomposed into an associated set of constituent axiom sets (the 8Ai's). The global theory 7" is then equivalent to the conjunctive combination of the corresponding sub-theories (the ST"i's),
where each sub-theory is the result of applying C to a constituent axiom set: ST"i d=ef C(,9.Ai).
In CLD, we define 7" to be the resultof conjunc-
where Cn isthe monotonic consequence (theory)operatorin classical logic.When the correspondingaxiom setsare understood, we willsay that the global theory isconjunctivelydecomposable intothese slice sub-theories.
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In terms of the circumscriptions, we have:
Again, when the corresponding axiom sets are understood, we will also speak of a circumscription being conjunctively decomposable into slice circumscriptions, e.g., for n = 2: sT"d,..., (s.4., sT". )).
Most
Subsets Do Not Qualify As Constituents for Decomposition: Note that, in general, in non-monotonic reasoning, one cannot blithely partition a global axiom set into a bunch of (distinct, or, more generally, overlapping) subsets (whose union is the global axiom set) any old way and get a conjunctive decomposition. This is because the axioms in one subset may conflict with those in another. E.g., consider the classic Quaker-Republican example of conflict in default reasoning: there are two default axioms, one saying that Quakers are typically Pacifists, and another saying that Republicans are typically non-Pacifists.
In addition, there are two for-sure axioms: that Nixon is a Quaker, and that he is a Republican.
Suppose we consider two subsets: one contalning the Quaker axioms, and another containing the Republican axioms. Treating a subset as a constituent axiom set means drawing non-monotonic conclusions from it as if there were no other axioms around. Doing so, from the first (with Quaker) one gets the default conclusion that Nixon is a Pacifist; from the second, one gets the default conclusion that Nixon is a nonPacifist.
Taking the conjunction of these two "subtheories" thus results in garbage: inconsistency. Yet the actual global theory is consistent: neither conclusion about Pacifism is sanctioned. Figure 2 illustrates. Our perspective is that, in general, non-monotonicity means a kind of logical non-modularity: when attempting to draw conclusions from a subset of the global axiom set, one must keep in mind the context of the remainder of the global axiom set. If one considers that remainder as an "internal" update, then that update may be non-monotonic.
Another way to view this situation is that non-monotonicity means logical globality: in general, a non-monotonic conclusion cannot be drawn until the entirety of the global axiom set is considered.
Locality:
Suppose we can find a conjunctive decomposition in which for some i, the slice's axiom set is a subset of the global, i.e., SAi C_,4. In this case, we say that the slice is a clean slice. Then we know that all the remaining axioms (A-SAi) in the global axiom set are irrelevant contez_, in an important sense, relative to the alice's axiom set SAi.
In this case, one can soundly, and in an important sense completely, perform inference locally: considering only the axioms in SA_, and using whatever standard procedures are available generally for the NM formalism. This is sound, because C(SAi) is then a subset of the global theory. This is complete, in a sense, because the contribution of S.gi to the global consequences requires only monotonic inference beyond its own local (NM) consequences C(SAi). By "irrelevant" above, then, we mean that one does not need to consider the remainder of the global axioms in order to do the essential non-monotonic aspect of the reasoning from 8Ai.
In the rest of this paper, we will be only considering decompositions that are clean. ([Grosof, 1992b] 
Disjoint Predicates
Our resultswillallmake use of the followingidea of decomposing the specified prioritization.
Composing
Prioritization: The concept of prioritizction overgroups of defaults is naturalin the specification processfor many applications:oftena group of defaults correspondsto a topic. Groups may, in turn, be composed of groups. Thus we may define prioritizations of prioritizations, in hierarchical or recursivefashion.Our example displaysthisstructure.
Our first resultis about decomposition on the basis of syntacticdisjointness of predicates.It captures a basic case of the intuitionthat syntactically "having nothing to do with each other" should imply strong irrelevance of the kind we discussedin the lastsection. axioms, such that the formula parts of the base and default axioms mention only predicates from a (possibly empty) subset of the previous partitions, and such that the global prioritization condition (0) is still met. Then all of the previous conclusions derived solely from the rest of the partitions' slices do not require retraction.
Application
to Main Example: The above theorems capture the first intuition that we discussed in section 2. At each point in the sequence of updates, Theorem 2 implies that inference can be localized: inferences about legged-ness can he performed in the slice that contains only the axioms about leggedness, and likewise for meetings. In o,,, main motivating example (section 2), we conjunctively decompose the global axiom set (after the last update _'_ ) into two slices by employing the disjoint predicates result (Theorem 1): one slice about legged-hess, and the oth.r slice about meetings.
In the bottom half, each inner box stands for a constituent axiom set.
conjunctive decomposition cf. Theorem 1 after the last update.
Theorem 3 guarantees that after each meetings update, all of the previous conclusions drawn from the legged-ness slice are safe, and vice versa.
General_ations:
Theorems 1, 2, and 3 generalize in several directions. Firstly, predicate (and function) symbols may overlap between the constituent axiom sets as long as they are fixed in the circumscription (see earlier discussion about fixing in section 3). Intuitively, it is OK to specify some predicate (and function) symbols as fixed if it is OK not to infer any default conclusions expressible purely in terms of those symbols.
Secondly, the prioritization condition can be relaxed somewhat. We take for granted in monotonic logics that a collection of for-sure (base) axioms B1,..., Bm can be equivalently replaced by the axiom B1 A ...^Bin. In prioritised default circumscription and most other expressively rich NM formalisms, however, one ca._-not, in general, equivalently replace the pair of def:_:.i: axioms (whose default formulas are) D1 and D': the default axiom (whose default formula is the junction) D1 A D2 (even in the case without prior." -i.e., when the prioritization is empty). Informati,'nal "grain size" of the defaults is important:
Definitional
having the two separate defaults means that, for example, D2 may "succeed" (i.e., be concluded non-monotonically from the defaults) even if D1 is "defeated" (e.g., is violated by the for-sure information), unlike if the only default present is D1 A D2. We will need equivalencepreserving (and information-preserving) reformulation in order to apply the decomposition on the reformulated representation back onto the original representation.
Circumscription
is defined in terms of second-order logic. We thus find it convenient and natural to define the kind of definitional reformulation we will need in terms of second-order logic, as well. We build on ,_:._ standard idea of a conservative extension, drawn f:_-the classical logical literature. In this and the next tion, we then develop several, increasingly complex tions of definitional reformulations, in order to hat.ale the grouping structure in various stages of our reformulations: groups of predicates, groups of individuals, groups of formulas.
In this paper, we mainly address reformulations ori- 
VP, Q. A2[P, Q] D AI[P]
VP. [AI[P] D (3Q. A2[P, Q])]
Another way to view the idea of conservatism in this definition is that A2 "says" exactly as much about P as A1 does. A2 in addition says stuff about Q. I.e., for any formula G[P] mentioning only P:
A2[P, Q] def --AI[P]
A 
Conservative
Extension, Uninformativeness, and Directionality: Equipped with the idea of a conservative extension, we are now ready to return to the question of refining the basic ides of definitional reformulation. In our "first cut" above, we found a need to formalize the constraint that the putative definitional reformulator U be uninformative, in both directions of the reformulation. In Definition 5, we observed that the property that a "definitional" reformulator U[P, Q] is a conservatively extending update precisely expresseses U's uninformativene_, in the direction of A1 to A2, i.e., about P. There, however, U is not really quite a reformulator in the sense we discussed in the '_irst cut", since A2 mentions not just the new symbols Q, but also the old symbols P. However, we can eztract the notion of uninformativeness present there, i.e., the "conservatism" in the idea of a conservative extension.
The property that U is a conservatively extending update is: property. This satifiability / consistency is conditional on A1. We take this conservativeness property as the basis for uninformativeness of a (putative) definitional reformulator U. However, we need the "return direction" uninformativeness as well:
.U[P,Q] which we can also write as: [W,Z] (where W, Y, and Z are distinct tuples of symbols) when:
1. U implies the equivalence of A1 and A2:
2. U is uninformative, i.e., conservative, in both directions of the reformulation, i.e., with respect to A1
and with respect to A2:
Discussion; Directionality: Having the second direction, in addition to the first direction, of the conservativeness property in Definition 7 rules out the nastily-behaved example that we discussed in Observation 4. However, the conservativeness property in Definition 7 reassuringly does permit, for example, the following, more intuitively reasonable basic-case definitional reformulator:
where the symbols are as in the example discussed in Observation 4) for any A1, A2. The property that U consists exclusively of (a conjunction of) explicit definitions ensures, in general, only one direction of conservativeness.
Conditionality
Versus Unconditionality of Conservativeness: Definition 7 is perhaps too "custom" in one regard, however. The conservativeness property is conditional: it depends on the particular A1 and A2. This is perhaps unsatisfactory intuitively, at least for some purposes, as a notion of "definitional"
in "definitional reformulator". vz. _Y. u[w, :. z] In the remainder of this paper, we will use this last, "backgrounded" version of the conservativeness property. We do so in order to formally simplify our later definitions of more complex kinds of definitional reformulators and reformulations, which are oriented towards particular uses. However, the "conditional" version of the conservativeness property is more fundamental and general, we believe, and is interesting to explore: we plan to do so in the future.
No Requirement
of ExpHcltness: Note that in Definition 7, we did not require U to he in the form of a conjunction of explicit definitions of new symbols in terms of old symbols.
We formalized / summarized the "definitional" flavor of the reforraulator as, simply, its conservativeness.
Our definition of definitional reformulator thus allows U to consist of implicit definitions (e.g., with reeursion) and partial definitions (i.e., necessary and sufficient conditions). (Later, in our result about the asocial monadic special case of disjoint deseribability (Theorem 16), the reformulator will consist exclusively of explicit definitions, however.)
Next, we define a definitional reformulation of a group of formulas, using a single common reformulator: one-by-one, into a new group of formulas. For this purpose, it is convenient to be able to abstract away from conditionalizing conservativeness on each of those formulas: we thus use the backgrounded version of conser_cativeness. Theorem 12 immediately yields results about locality of inference, using Theorem 2, and about safety of updating, using Theorem 3.
Next, we consider a special case of disjoint describability: asocial-monadic. D; R; fix W; Z), or a corresponding CLD axiom set, is asocially monadic when:
1. All predicates in Z are monadic, i.e., 1-ary (a.k.a., unary).
2. The base sentence B has the form of a conjunction of universaP s formulas. We will refer to these as the base formulas (axioms).
Every default formula (axiom) in D is quantifier-free.
4. No base sentence (axiom) in B, and no default formula (axiom) in D, "mixes" individuals. I.e., in their clausal forms, no clause contains two literals with different arguments.
Intuition: different individuals "don't want to have anything to do with each other", i.e., they are "asocial".
5. All terms appearing in the base and default formulas are ground, except for primitive variables.
6. The prioritization R is either layered (e.g., parallel), or it is point-modular (see definition below). 9. Besides in the UNA, equality does not appear in the base or default formulas.
All
(Remember, equality, when viewed as a predicate, is binary, not monadic.)
Definition 15
(Point-Modular Prioritization) Point-modular prioritization generalizes (i.e., the class includes) the prioritization that is typical in default inheritance networks.
By "point" here, we mean an individual in the logical language, either named (a ground term, e.g. Eel) or unnamed (e.g., referred to by a first-order variable, e.g., x in bat(x) D 2legs(z)). (This idea of a point can be straightforwardly generalized to a tuple of individuals (e.g., (Boss(4321),d)) to handle predicates / formulas with arity more than one; but we are only considering here the unary case in the context of the asocially monadic case.) By pointmodular, we mean that the overall prioritization is equivalent to the composition of some external prioritization (over the points) composed with a tuple of internal prioritizations, one per point. Point-modularity results when the prioritization is only specified between the same instantiations of different defaults.
l_Termlnology:
By universal, we mean without existential quantifiers. E.g., when the bat default has higher priority than the mammal default at each point: (the default axiom whose default formula is) The basic idea of the reformulation is to divide the base and default axioms into groups: one group per named individual, plus a catch-all "remainder" group for all other, unnamed individuals. Some reformulation, of a relatively simple kind that is different from decomposition and one-by-one definitional reformulation, is involved in order to break up the quantified base axioms and the open defaults into these cases. Figure 5 illustrates this logical flow. The details of the overall reformulation are, however, a bit involved to define; bear with us.
To begin with, we partition the base and default formulas according to which arguments appear in them.
Let J de.=f {1 ..... rn} index the set of all ground terms aj that appear in the base or default formulas.
Let BOj stand for the tuple of base formulas that mention aj. Each of its members we write as BOjk [Z] .
Let BOV stand for the tuple of base formulas, other than the UNA, that mention a free variable (all of these are universally quantified). Each of its members we write as Yx. BOVk [Z, x] . Here x is a single (free) individual variable.
We treat the default formulas similarly to the base. Let DOj stand for the tuple of default formulas that mention aj. Each of its members we write as DOjk [Z] .
Let DOV stand for the tuple of default formulas that mention a free variable (i. For each j E J, Let Blj stand for the conjunction of (all members of) the tuples BOj and BIVj.
For j = m + 1 (i.e., the unnamed case), let Blm + 1 stand for the conjunction of (all members of) the tuple B2V plus the UNA.
For each j E J, Let Dlj stand for the concatenation of the tuples DOj and D1Vj.
For j = m + 1 (i.e., the unnamed case), let Dlm+ 1 stand for the tuple D2V.
Let Rj be defined as the prioritization internal to Dlj, i.e., as R _rj, where, for each j = 1,..., m+ 1, Nj is the index tuple of Dlj.
toSJ.
For query-answering about a new named individual b (named in the query), just introduce the new term b into the set of terms that are indexed by J in the theorem. The only additional requirement is that the UNA ensure its distinctness from the other named individuals. 
